Imagen de Portada

On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion

Durante las últimas décadas, se ha desarrollado un intenso debate en torno a la caracterización de las emociones en el que se perfilaron dos enfoques que se presentaban como incompatibles entre sí: la perspectiva somática y la perspectiva cognitiva de las emociones. En este trabajo me propongo evalu...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Melamed, Andrea F.
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:spa
Publicado: ARFIL y UNL 2022
Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11894
id oai:bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar:article-11894
recordtype dspace
institution Universidad Nacional del Litoral
collection Publicaciones periódicas
language spa
format Artículo revista
description Durante las últimas décadas, se ha desarrollado un intenso debate en torno a la caracterización de las emociones en el que se perfilaron dos enfoques que se presentaban como incompatibles entre sí: la perspectiva somática y la perspectiva cognitiva de las emociones. En este trabajo me propongo evaluar si estas son en efecto posiciones irreconciliables, a partir de la sistematización de las tesis que le han dado identidad a cada una de estas perspectivas. Habiendo desarticulado algunos puntos de divergencia, finalmente, advierto en qué sentido considero que el debate se mantiene irreducible.
author Melamed, Andrea F.
spellingShingle Melamed, Andrea F.
On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
author_facet Melamed, Andrea F.
author_sort Melamed, Andrea F.
title On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
title_short On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
title_full On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
title_fullStr On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
title_full_unstemmed On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
title_sort on the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion
publisher ARFIL y UNL
publishDate 2022
url https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11894
_version_ 1741231467197890560
spelling oai:bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar:article-118942022-08-12T15:52:29Z On the irreducibility of the debate between somatic and cognitive theories of emotion Sobre la irreductibilidad del debate entre teorías somáticas y cognitivas de las emociones Melamed, Andrea F. Durante las últimas décadas, se ha desarrollado un intenso debate en torno a la caracterización de las emociones en el que se perfilaron dos enfoques que se presentaban como incompatibles entre sí: la perspectiva somática y la perspectiva cognitiva de las emociones. En este trabajo me propongo evaluar si estas son en efecto posiciones irreconciliables, a partir de la sistematización de las tesis que le han dado identidad a cada una de estas perspectivas. Habiendo desarticulado algunos puntos de divergencia, finalmente, advierto en qué sentido considero que el debate se mantiene irreducible. During the last decades an intense debate has developed around the characterization of emotions, in which two approaches were presented as incompatible with each other: the somatic and the cognitive perspective of emotions. In this paper I propose to evaluate whether these are in fact irreconcilable positions, starting from the systematization of the theses that have identified each of these perspectives. Having disarticulated some points of divergence, I finally consider in what sense the debate remains irreducible. ARFIL y UNL 2022-06-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion artículo Articulo info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo application/pdf https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11894 10.14409/topicos.v0i43.11894 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; Núm. 43 (2022): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 200-223 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; No 43 (2022): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 200-223 1668-723X 1666-485X 10.14409/topicos.v0i43 spa info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/ https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11894/16268 /*ref*/Arnold, M. (1960). Emotion and Personality. New York: Columbia University Press. Barlassina, L., & Newen, A. (2014). “The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3), pp. 637–678. Calvo, P., & Gomila, T. (2008). “Directions for and Embodied Cognitive Science: Toward an Integrated Approach”. En P. Calvo & T. Gomila (Eds.), Handbook of Cognitive Science. An Empodied Approach San Diego/Oxford/Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1–25. Charland, L. C. (1997). “Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal”. Philosophy of Science, 64(4), https://doi.org/10.1086/392572 Clore, G. L. (1994). “Why Emotions Are Never Unconscious”. En P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 285–290. Colombetti, G. (2010). “Enaction, sense–making and emotion”. En J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, & E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, pp. 145–164. Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam. Ekman, P. (1977). “Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement”. En J. Blacking (Ed.), The Anthropology of the Body. London: Academic Press, pp. 39–84. Frijda, N. H., Manstead, A. S. R., & Bem, S. (2000). “The influence of emotions on beliefs”. En N. H. Frijda, A. S. R. Manstead, & S. Bem (Eds.), Emotions and Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–9. Frijda, N. H., & Zeelenberg, M. (2001). “Appraisal: What is the dependent?” En K. R. Scherer, K. R. Schorr, & T. Johnston (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 141–156. Gazzaniga, M. S., & LeDoux, J. E. (1978). The Integrated Mind. New York: Plenum Press. Goldie, P. (2000). The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Vol. 53). New York: Oxford University Press. Gordon, R. M. (1987). The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press. Griffiths, P. E. (1997). What emotions really are: The problem of psychological categories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). “The Conceptual Framework for the Investigation of Emotions”. En Y. Gustafsson, C. Kronqvist, & M. McEachrane (Eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hutchinson, P. (2009). Emotion–philosophy–science. En Y. Gustafsson, C. Kronqvist, & M. McEachrane (Eds.), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives. London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. James, W. (1884). “What is an emotion?” Mind, 9, 188–205. James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology. Chicago: Enciclopaedia Britannica, Inc. Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessell, T. M. (1997). Neurociencia y conducta. Hoboken (N. J.): Prentice Hall. Kenny, A. (1963). Action, Emotion, and Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Kenny, A. (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Lang, P. J. (1988). “What are the Data of Emotion?” En V. Hamilton, G. H. Bower, & N. H. Frijda (Eds.), Cognitive perspectives on emotion and motivation. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 173–191. Lang, P. J. (2010). “Emotion and Motivation: Toward Consensus Definitions and a Common Research Purpose”. Emotion Review, 2(3), pp. 229–233. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073910361984 Lazarus, R. S. (1982). “Thoughts on the relations between emotion and cognition”. American Psychologist, 37(9), pp. 1019–1024. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.37.9.1019 Lazarus, R. S. (1984). “On the primacy of cognition”. American Psychologist, 39(2), pp. 124–129. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.39.2.124 Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. Lazarus, R. S. (2001). “Relational Meaning and Discrete Emotions”. En K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, Methods, Research. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 37–67. LeDoux, J. E. (1994). “Emotional Processing, but Not Emotions, Can Occur Unconsciously”. En P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 291–292. Leventhal, H., & Scherer, K. R. (1987). “The Relationship of Emotion to Cognition: A Functional Approach to a Semantic Controversy”. Cognition & Emotion, 1(1), pp. 3-28. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699938708408361 Lewis, M. (2008). “The emergence of human emotions”. En M. Lewis, J. Haviland–Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, Third edition. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 304–319. Lyons, W. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lyons, W. (1999). “The Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion”. En T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power (Eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Chichester, (UK): Wiley, pp. 21–44. Melamed, A. F. (2018). “Las emociones y su relación con la cognición: consideraciones sobre las objeciones de Anthony Kenny a las feeling theories”. Disputatio, 7 (8). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2550914 Moors, A. (2013). “On the causal role of appraisal in emotion”. Emotion Review, 5(2), pp. 132–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912463601 Moors, A., Ellsworth, P. C., Scherer, K. R., & Frijda, N. H. (2013). “Appraisal theories of emotion: State of the art and future development”. Emotion Review, 5(2), pp. 119–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912468165 Pérez, D. I. (2013). Sentir, desear, creer. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. Power, M. J., & Dalgleish, T. (2008). Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder (2nd ed.). Hove (U.K.): Taylor & Francis. Prinz, J. J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Press. Prinz, J. J. (2005). “Are Emotions Feelings?” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(8–10), pp. 9–25. Rowlands, M. (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Cambridge (Mass): The MIT Press. Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State”. Psychological review, 69(5). https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021465 Siemer, M., Mauss, I., & Gross, J. J. (2007). “Same Situation—Different Emotions: How Appraisals Shape Our Emotions”. Emotion, 7(3), pp. 592–600. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.3.592 Solomon, R. C. (1973). “Emotions and Choice”. Review of Metaphisics, 28(1), pp. 20–41. Solomon, R. C. (1976). The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion. New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday. Solomon, R. C. (2001). “Thoughts and Feelings: What Is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions, and Does It Neglect Affectivity?” En Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 148–192. Solomon, R. C. (2003). Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice. New York: Oxford University Press. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1965.tb01386.x Wilson, J. R. S. (1972). Emotion and Object (Vol. 23). Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press. Zajonc, R. B. (1980). “Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences”. American Psychologist, 35(2), pp. 151–175. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.35.2.151 Zajonc, R. B. (1984). “On the Primacy of Affect”. American Psychologist, 39, pp. 117–123. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Derechos de autor 2022 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe
score 11.8626

Ejemplares similares