Julio De Zan against moral realism. A conceptual reconstruction of its proximity with Christine Korsgaard and Ronald Dworkin
In the present work of homage to Professor Julio De Zan, I focus on his critique of moral realism. In his book Ethics, Rights and Justice, De Zan denies that there are natural or metaphysical properties in the moral realm. In order to understand his criticism, I propose a conceptual reconstruction o...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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ARFIL y UNL
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/9004 |
| Sumario: | In the present work of homage to Professor Julio De Zan, I focus on his critique of moral realism. In his book Ethics, Rights and Justice, De Zan denies that there are natural or metaphysical properties in the moral realm. In order to understand his criticism, I propose a conceptual reconstruction of the philosophical presuppositions that exist for his rejection of moral realism. With this purpose, my proposal of conceptual reconstruction consists in complementing the ethics of the discourse defended by De Zan, relating his proposal with two philosophical complements: on the one hand, with the rejection towards moral realism made by Ronald Dworkin in his book Justice for Hedgehogs, on the other hand, with the rejection towards moral realism directed by Christine Korsgaard in her book The Sources of Normativity. Although the three philosophers maintain relevant differences, they also maintain a rejection of moral realism based on certain family resemblances. |
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