On the Ground of the Necessity of Empirical Laws of Science in an Improper Sense in Kant. A Critique of Michael Bennett McNulty
The aim of this paper is to criticize an article by Michael B. McNulty published in 2015, namely, “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws”. In this article, McNulty examines Kant’s conception of the necessity of empirical laws belonging to what, in...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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ARFIL y UNL
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/8663 |
| Sumario: | The aim of this paper is to criticize an article by Michael B. McNulty published in 2015, namely, “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws”. In this article, McNulty examines Kant’s conception of the necessity of empirical laws belonging to what, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, is called science in an “improper” sense. McNulty considers the only science in an improper sense mentioned by Kant, namely, chemistry. In his article, McNulty presents an original and interesting interpretation of that conception. According to this interpretation, certain ideas of reason, which the author calls “elements”, are the ground of the necessity of chemical laws. We will make three criticisms of this interpretation. 1) McNulty’s thesis according to which from the perspective of reason chemical laws are strictly necessary is cognitively irrelevant for us. 2) McNulty never mentions any of Kant’s texts as clearly supporting his interpretation of the ground of the necessity of chemical laws. 3) Our interpretation of the regulative necessity of chemical laws is closer to Kant’s conception of these laws than McNulty’s reading. |
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