Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein

The present work revolves around two realistic readings of the "second Wittgenstein", one of non-metaphysical character emerged in Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit (1991) and another,"realistic metaphysics", in H. Mounce's"Wittgenstein and Clas...

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Autor Principal: Yuan, María Sol
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Publicado: ARFIL y UNL 2019
Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/8112
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spelling oai:bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar:article-81122021-03-29T11:36:37Z Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein Two versions of realism around Wittgenstein Yuan, María Sol The present work revolves around two realistic readings of the "second Wittgenstein", one of non-metaphysical character emerged in Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit (1991) and another,"realistic metaphysics", in H. Mounce's"Wittgenstein and Classical Realism" (2005). From the confrontation of both positions, the thread of critical reading that will lead our work will be that we cannot sustain any realistic position "metaphysics" (to name it in a very general way) in relation to the thesis of the second Wittgenstein. The practical background on which the descriptions of this author are based shows that non-metaphysical, contingent basis on which we base our facts, concepts and objectivity. This brings us closer to a notion of realism in which concepts and reality already have meaning beforehand as the praxis in which they take root guarantees our dealings with what surrounds us. The foundation is not the reason, the conscience, the correspondence or adaptation to a "naked" reality; it is the praxis, the common place and the balance between human beings and the world. El presente trabajo gira en torno a dos lecturas realistas del "segundo Wittgenstein", una de carácter no metafísico surgida en The Realistic Spirit (1991) de Cora Diamond y otra lectura "realista metafísica", presentada a partir de la interpretación de H. Mounce en "Wittgenstein and Classical Realism" (2005). A partir de la confrontación de ambas posiciones, el hilo de lectura crítica que conducirá nuestro trabajo será que no podemos sostener ninguna posición realista "metafísica" (para denominarlo de un modo muy general) en relación con las tesis del segundo Wittgenstein. El trasfondo práctico sobre el que se apoyan las descripciones de este autor muestra ese fundamento no metafísico sino contingente sobre el que basamos nuestros hechos, conceptos y objetividad. Esto nos acerca a una noción de realismo en el que conceptos y realidad ya cuentan con significado de antemano en tanto la praxisen la que se enraízan garantiza nuestro trato con lo que nos rodea. El fundamento no es la razón, la conciencia, la correspondencia o adecuación a una realidad "desnuda"; es la praxis, el lugar común y el equilibrio entre los seres humanos y mundo. ARFIL y UNL 2019-04-03 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion artículo Articulo info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo application/pdf https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/8112 10.14409/topicos.v0i35.8112 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; Núm. 35 (2018): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 120-139 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; No 35 (2018): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 120-139 1668-723X 1666-485X 10.14409/topicos.v0i35 spa info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/ https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/8112/11608 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Derechos de autor 2019 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe
institution Universidad Nacional del Litoral
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language spa
format Artículo revista
description The present work revolves around two realistic readings of the "second Wittgenstein", one of non-metaphysical character emerged in Cora Diamond's The Realistic Spirit (1991) and another,"realistic metaphysics", in H. Mounce's"Wittgenstein and Classical Realism" (2005). From the confrontation of both positions, the thread of critical reading that will lead our work will be that we cannot sustain any realistic position "metaphysics" (to name it in a very general way) in relation to the thesis of the second Wittgenstein. The practical background on which the descriptions of this author are based shows that non-metaphysical, contingent basis on which we base our facts, concepts and objectivity. This brings us closer to a notion of realism in which concepts and reality already have meaning beforehand as the praxis in which they take root guarantees our dealings with what surrounds us. The foundation is not the reason, the conscience, the correspondence or adaptation to a "naked" reality; it is the praxis, the common place and the balance between human beings and the world.
author Yuan, María Sol
spellingShingle Yuan, María Sol
Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
author_facet Yuan, María Sol
author_sort Yuan, María Sol
title Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
title_short Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
title_full Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
title_fullStr Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
title_full_unstemmed Dos versiones de realismo en torno a Wittgenstein
title_sort dos versiones de realismo en torno a wittgenstein
publisher ARFIL y UNL
publishDate 2019
url https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/8112
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