On Hegel’s concept of freedom
The article aims to highlight the relevance of dialectical logic for the concept of freedom. To this end, Ungler begins by pointing to some fundamental difficulties that arise for both (pre–Kantian) dogmatic metaphysics and Kant’s transcendental philosophy in the concept of freedom. With regard to K...
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| Autores Principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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ARFIL y UNL
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11901 |
| Sumario: | The article aims to highlight the relevance of dialectical logic for the concept of freedom. To this end, Ungler begins by pointing to some fundamental difficulties that arise for both (pre–Kantian) dogmatic metaphysics and Kant’s transcendental philosophy in the concept of freedom. With regard to Kant's transcendental philosophy, Ungler emphasizes his revolutionary insight that freedom is no longer understood as a property of a thing but rather as a self–relationship (autonomy). However, the fundamental problem that the concept of freedom requires us to think and thus to resolve the contradiction remains unsolved in Kant. Ungler points to the solution of this problem with regard to §§ 5–7 of Hegel's Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. Finally, critical remarks on prevailing tendencies in the interpretation of freedom demonstrate the relevance of Hegel's concept of freedom. |
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