Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume
This paper aims at clarifying the meaning and function of experience within the framework of Hume's theory of knowledge. In order to do so, I will examine two interpretations that can be reconstructed in secondary literature: the one which understands experience as simple impressions of sensati...
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2022
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This paper aims at clarifying the meaning and function of experience within the framework of Hume's theory of knowledge. In order to do so, I will examine two interpretations that can be reconstructed in secondary literature: the one which understands experience as simple impressions of sensation and the one that conceives it as patterns of connected perceptions. I argue that the first perspective is not suitable to understand the epistemic role of the experience, which inclines me towards the second interpretation. However, this interpretation has not been sufficiently developed by the authors who suggest it. My purpose is to carry out this task, offering a series of clarifications that make it more robust in order to elucidate why, for Hume, experience is the touchstone concerning knowledge about matters of fact. Thus, I will show that the meaning of experience within causal inferences is related to cases that we collect through observation and arrange into collections or patterns, which work as evidence to establish or justify epistemic statements. Finally, in order to accurately understand its function within this type of inferences, I will distinguish experience from impressions and habit. |
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Calvente, Sofía |
| spellingShingle |
Calvente, Sofía Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| author_facet |
Calvente, Sofía |
| author_sort |
Calvente, Sofía |
| title |
Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| title_short |
Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| title_full |
Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| title_fullStr |
Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume |
| title_sort |
towards a connected interpretation of experience in the philosophy of david hume |
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ARFIL y UNL |
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2022 |
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https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11888 |
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oai:bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar:article-118882022-08-12T15:52:29Z Towards a Connected Interpretation of Experience in the Philosophy of David Hume Hacia una interpretación conectada de la experiencia en la filosofía de David Hume Calvente, Sofía This paper aims at clarifying the meaning and function of experience within the framework of Hume's theory of knowledge. In order to do so, I will examine two interpretations that can be reconstructed in secondary literature: the one which understands experience as simple impressions of sensation and the one that conceives it as patterns of connected perceptions. I argue that the first perspective is not suitable to understand the epistemic role of the experience, which inclines me towards the second interpretation. However, this interpretation has not been sufficiently developed by the authors who suggest it. My purpose is to carry out this task, offering a series of clarifications that make it more robust in order to elucidate why, for Hume, experience is the touchstone concerning knowledge about matters of fact. Thus, I will show that the meaning of experience within causal inferences is related to cases that we collect through observation and arrange into collections or patterns, which work as evidence to establish or justify epistemic statements. Finally, in order to accurately understand its function within this type of inferences, I will distinguish experience from impressions and habit. En este trabajo nos proponemos hacer un aporte para esclarecer el sentido y la función de la experiencia en el marco de la teoría del conocimiento de Hume. Para ello examinaremos dos interpretaciones que pueden reconstruirse en la literatura secundaria: la que la entiende como impresiones simples de sensación y la que la concibe como patrones de percepciones conectadas. Consideramos que la primera perspectiva no es adecuada para comprender el rol epistémico de la experiencia, lo que nos inclina hacia la segunda interpretación. Sin embargo, esta última no ha sido lo suficientemente desarrollada por los autores que la sugieren. Nuestro propósito es llevar a cabo esa tarea pendiente, ofreciendo una serie de precisiones que la hacen más robusta a los fines de elucidar por qué para Hume la experiencia es la piedra de toque en el conocimiento sobre cuestiones de hecho. Así, mostraremos que el sentido que adquiere la experiencia en las inferencias causales es el de casos que recogemos mediante la observación y organizamos en colecciones o patrones, los que funcionan como evidencia para establecer o justificar enunciados epistémicos. Por último, para comprender la especificidad de su función en este tipo de inferencias, distinguiremos la experiencia de las impresiones y del hábito. ARFIL y UNL 2022-06-30 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion artículo Articulo info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo application/pdf https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11888 10.14409/topicos.v0i43.11888 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; Núm. 43 (2022): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 47-75 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; No 43 (2022): Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe; 47-75 1668-723X 1666-485X 10.14409/topicos.v0i43 spa info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/ https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/11888/16262 /*ref*/Ainslie, D. (2015): Hume’s True Skepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Baier, A. (1991): A Progress of Sentiments. Reflections on Hume's Treatise, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Buckle, S. (2001): Hume’s Enlightenment Tract. 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Beauchamp, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Versión castellana de Jaime Salas Ortueta, Alianza, Madrid, 1980. Citado por sección y número de párrafo. Hume, D. (1751/1998): An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals [EPM], editado por Tom Beauchamp, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Versión castellana de Marcelo Mendoza Hurtado, Bernal, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes/Prometeo, 2015. Citado por sección y número de párrafo. Hume, D. (1757/2003): The Natural History of Religion/Historia natural de la religión [NHR], edición bilingüe, introducción de Sergio Rábade, traducción de Concha Cogolludo, Madrid, Trotta. Citado por número de sección y paginación de la edición bilingüe. Hume, D. (1779/1947): Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [DNR], edición e introducción de Norman Kemp Smith, Indianapolis, Bobbs–Merrill. Versión castellana de Carlos Mellizo, Buenos Aires, Aguilar, 1981. Citado por parte y paginación de la edición de Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith, N. (1941): The Philosophy of David Hume. A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines, Londres, McMillan. Kemp, C. (2004): “Our Ideas in Experience. Hume’s Examples in ‘Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses’,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 13 (3) pp. 445–470. Landy, D. (2018): Hume’s Science of Human Nature. Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation, Nueva York, Routledge. Loeb, L. (2002): Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Nueva York, Oxford University Press. Owen, D. (1999): Hume’s Reason, Nueva York, Oxford University Press. Rocknak, S. (2013): Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects, Dordretch, Springer. Rodríguez Valls, F. (1991): “Experiencia y conocimiento en David Hume,” Thémata. Revista de Filosofía, 8, pp. 45-67. Shapin, S. (1996): The Scientific Revolution, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Stroud, B. (1977): Hume, Londres y Nueva York, Routledge & Kegan Paul. info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Derechos de autor 2022 Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe |
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