Subnational fiscal decentralization in Argentina between 2005 and 2017. Vertical fiscal imbalance, autonomy and fiscal dependency of the municipal jurisdiction
Argentina has a federal, multi-jurisdictional government with a financial coordination mechanism of tax joint participation. This paper aims to contribute empirically to the analysis of subnational fiscal relations between the years 2005–2017 and specifically to the analysis of the...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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Ediciones UNL. Secretaría de Extensión de la UNL
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/CE/article/view/10483 |
| Sumario: | Argentina has a federal, multi-jurisdictional government with a financial coordination mechanism of tax joint participation. This paper aims to contribute empirically to the analysis of subnational fiscal relations between the years 2005–2017 and specifically to the analysis of the municipal fiscal decentralization. The descriptive investigation is based on data from the Saving - Investment - Non-Financial Public Administration Financing scheme, published by the Argentinian Ministry of Economy. First, it deals with some theories related to fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralization and the implications of the conceptual differentiation between asymmetry and vertical fiscal imbalance. Second, methodological aspects of the research and of the poli-cies of decentralization, autonomy and fiscal dependence are dealt with. The quantitative results of the empirical analysis referring to the period 2005 – 2017 show a strong concentration of income at the provincial level and a greater decentralization of public spending towards municipal jurisdiction, as it happens in the Nation-Province fiscal relation.
In addition, and specifically for the municipal level, a permanent vertical fiscal imbalance is observed, since fiscal transfers of national and provincial origin do not resolve the fiscal asymmetry of that jurisdiction. Likewise, the autonomy or municipal fiscal correspondence was low, while its dependence on fiscal transfers was high and heterogeneous among the municipal public sector consolidated by provinces. Finally, and based on the results, some aspects of the design of fiscal federalism and municipalities will be reflected upon. |
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