Can we speak of a Deleuzian cogito? An interpretation of Difference and repetition’s passive synthesis
Within the free and discordant relations that the faculties establish among each other, Deleuze outlines a particular experience, that of the genesis of thought, in which the faculties nevertheless maintain a fixed order: the origin of thought is to be found in the sensibility, which communicates it...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | spa |
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ARFIL y UNL
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/Topicos/article/view/10007 |
| Sumario: | Within the free and discordant relations that the faculties establish among each other, Deleuze outlines a particular experience, that of the genesis of thought, in which the faculties nevertheless maintain a fixed order: the origin of thought is to be found in the sensibility, which communicates its objet to the imagination, then to the memory, and finally to thought. And it is because of this invariance that such an
experience can be identified and named as that of a cogito, that of the Deleuzian cogito for a dissolved self. Following our hypothesis, according to which chapter 2 of Difference and repetition, “The repetition for itself”, constitutes a very detailed exposition of such a cogito, in this paper we will try to explore those developments, exhibiting the emergence of the faculties of the Imagination, Memory and Thought, and the relations they establish with each other in the process. |
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